Document Type
Article
Abstract
This essay highlights certain problems attending Whitehead’s metaphysics beginning with his ambiguous use of feeling, extending on to his dogmatic rejection of bifurcation due largely to his misunderstanding of Poincaré’s conventionalism, his mathematicizing, and his life-long commitment to logicism first envisioned in his and Bertrand Russell’s Principia Mathematica leading to naturalistic reductionism, and his ill-considered commitment to William James’s radical empiricism. It concludes that these difficulties should not be ascribed to process thought generally. A number of candidates provide process perspectives without this Whiteheadian baggage. Collectively they offer an important and fruitful area of investigation that will accrue to the benefit of process thought as a whole.
This is a revision that has been expanded to include additional material.
The previous version of this article may be found at http://digitalcommons.library.uab.edu/libraries-pw/14/
Publication Date
2025
College or School
UAB Libraries
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Flannery, Michael A., "“Feeling” and Other Problems in Whitehead’s Metaphysics" (2025). Libraries Professional Work. 27.
https://digitalcommons.library.uab.edu/libraries-pw/27
